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Abstract 
This paper proposes a REversible Second-ORder Taylor (RESORT) expansion of the expenditure function to 
compute compensated income from ordinary demand functions as an alternative to the algorithm proposed by Vartia. 
These algorithms provide measures of Hicksian welfare changes and Koniis-type cost of living indices. RESORT 
also validates the results by checking the matrix of compensated price effects, obtained through the Slutsky equation, 
for symmetry and negative semi-defIniteness as required by expenditure minimization. In contrast, Vartia's 
algorithm provides no validation procedure. RESORT is similar to Vartia's algorithm in using price steps. It 
computes compensated income at each step "forward" from the initial to the terminal prices, and insures that the 
compensated income computed "backward" is equal to its value computed in the "forward" procedure. Thus, 
RESORT is "reversible" and guarantees unique values of compensated income for each set of prices and, as a reSUlt, 
also unique measures of welfare changes and cost of living indices. These unique results are not, however, 
guaranteed by the usual Taylor series expansion for computing compensated income. 
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1. Introduction 
The existence in theory of the income compensation function was established by Hurwicz 
and Uzawa (1971). Chipman and Moore (1980) noted that what was then lacking was a 
"practical algorithm" for computing compensated income from ordinary demand functions. In 
theory, the significance of this algorithm lies in permitting compensated income, which is 
unobservable, to be obtained from ordinary demand functions estimated from price and income 
data. In practice, the value of this algorithm lies in providing at the same time measures of 
Hicksian welfare changes and Konus-type true indices of the cost of living when prices change. 
Moreover, this algorithm widens the scope of empirical demarid analysis to demand systems with 
unknown underlying utility functions that in principle are "integrable. "1 Indeed, it is precisely 
for these demand systems that a compensated income "approximation" algorithm is necessary. 
Approximations are unnecessary if the utility function is known because the "true" compensated 
income is obtainable exactly from the dual expenditure function. Thus, demand systems need 
not be limited to the standard models derived from an indirect utility function or expenditure 
function of an explicit parametric form such as the translog (Christensen, Jorgenson, and Lau, 
1975; Christensen and Caves, 1980) and the "almost ideal demand system" or AIDS (Deaton 
and Muellbauer, 1980a and 1980b). 
IIntegrability implies a well-behaved demand system for which an underlying utility function exists. The utility 
function may not, however, be recoverable in closed form and, thus, may remain unknown. An "integrable" ­
demand system has a symmetric and negative semi-deflnite matrix of compensated price effects. This is equivalent 
to linear homogeneity and concavity in prices of the underlying expenditure function that may also be unknown. 
An example is the generalized logit demand model discussed in section 5. 
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To fill the need noted earlier by Chipman and Moore, Vartia (1983) proposed numerical 
integration of ordinary demand functions to compute compensated income. The procedure is 
implemented stepwise, over price increments connecting the initial to the terminal price vector. 
This paper, however, proposes a REversible Second-ORder Taylor (RESORT) expansion of the 
expenditure function to compute compensated income from ordinary demand functions. It 
follows Vartia' s stepwise procedure and computes compensated income at each price step 
"forward," starting with the initial income and prices. It is "reversible" in that the solution of 
compensated income at any intermediate price step will be the same when the procedure is 
reversed "backward," starting with the terminal compensated income and prices. That is, 
RESORT yields a unique compensated income at each price step. This is a desirable property 
because a unique solution is not assured by a standard Taylor series approximation. Also, the 
stepwise procedure reduces the approximation error of a one-step second-order Taylor 
expansion. 
The second-order terms of RESORT yield the matrix of compensated price effects. All the 
elements of this matrix are computed from ordinary demand functions by means of the Slutsky 
equation. Thus, RESORT provides a check for the validity of the compensated income 
computed at each price step by evaluating the above matrix for symmetry and negative semi­
definiteness as required by expenditure minimization. In contrast, Vartia's algorithm provides 
no check for the validity of the computed compensated income because his procedure does not 
compute the matrix of compensated price effects. It is important, however, to provide validity 
checks in empirical applications because there is no assurance that the demand system utilized 
by the algorithm is well-behaved within the price range under examination. 
3 
Section 2 of this paper shows that measuring compensated incomes when prices change 
yields measures of welfare changes and cost of living indices. Section 3 presents the RESORT 
algorithm while section 4 presents Vartia's algorithm. Section 5 presents numerical results from 
the computations of compensated income in four separate illustrations. While these algorithms 
are applicable to any arbitrary finite number of goods, the illustrations utilize only two goods 
for simplicity. The first three illustrations use ordinary demand functions derived from an 
explicit utility function. In these illustrations, the "true" compensated incomes are known. 
Therefore, it is possible to compare the closeness to the true compensated income of the 
approximations from RESORT and Vartia's algorithm. Vartia's and the RESORT 
approximations are both very close to the true values but those from RESORT are closer in two 
of the three cases. The fourth illustration utilizes ordinary demand functions from a model with 
an unknown utility function. This is precisely the situation for which Vartia's method and 
RESORT are intended. In this case, Vartia's and the RESORT approximations are very close 
to each other but their relative precision cannot be assessed because the true compensated income 
is unknown. 
In one of the four illustrations, negative semi-definiteness of the matrix of compensated price 
effects was violated to demonstrate the ability of RESORT to detect violations of theoretical 
restrictions. It is shown that RESORT can determine when demand systems violate the 
requirements of expenditure minimization, at the same instance when the violations would be 
undetected by Vartia's algorithm. 
Section 6 concludes this paper. 
-
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2. Compensated Income, Welfare Change, and the Cost of Living Index 
Consider a situation where prices change from pO to pT while utility correspondingly changes 
from VO to UT. Assume that there are n goods so that pO = {p;O} and pT = {pt}, i = 1, 2, ... , 
n. In general, let C(P, U) be an expenditure function that gives the minimum cost at prices p 
to attain a given utility level U where p is either pO or pT and U is either VO or UT. The 
superscript "0" denotes the original (old) and "T" denotes the terminal (new) situations. 
By duality between expenditure minimization and utility maximization, C(p°, VO) and C(pT, 
if) are equal to the actual total expenditures on goods bought at the prices given by the vectors 
pO and pT. These expenditures are known, given by the ordinary demand functions estimated 
from observable price, income and quantity data. However, C(pT, UO) and C(p°, if) are not 
observable because these are defmed by compensated demand functions that cannot be estimated 
directly since utility is not observable. The problem is to approximate C(pT, VO) given C(p°, VO) 
or to approximate C(p°, UT) given C(pT, UT) based only on the ordinary demand functions that 
give these starting values. The underlying utility function is presumed unknowable. 
By definition, C(pT, VO) is the "compensated income" that allows the consumer to maintain 
the utility level VO as prices change from pO to pT. Similarly, C(p°, UT) is the "compensated 
income" that allows the consumer to maintain the utility level UTas prices change back from pT 
to pO. The change in compensated income between these price situations determines Hicksian 
-
measures of welfare change while the ratio of compensated incomes gives Koniis-type true 
indices of the cost of living. The Hicksian compensating variation (CV) and equivalent variation 
(BV) are defined as, 
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Let observed income or expenditure C(p°, 'If) change to C(pT, if) and defme the change as, 
(3) /11 = C(PT,U T) - C(p°,Uo) . 
By combining (1), (2), and (3), CV and EV become, 
(4) CV = C(po,Uo) - C(PT,UO) + /11; 
If (3) is zero, (4) and (5) conform to the original Hicksian definition. 2 
The Koniis-type true indices of the cost of living (Koniis, 1939; Pollak, 1971; Diewert, 
1980) may be denoted as 1(p°, pT; UO) and 1(p°, pT; c.f) where va or UT is the reference 
"standard of living" in each instance. By defmition, 
C(p T Uo)(6)	 1(p0,p T; Uo) = '
 
C(p0, Uo)
 
In practice, these are approximated by the Laspeyres price index, which is the upper bound to 
the true index for va, and by the Paasche price index, which is the lower bound to the true index 
2Following Hicks (1956), CV uses "old" utility rfJ whereas EV uses "new" utility UT as the fixed reference 
utility level. While this utility referencing is universally followed, there is no universal convention on the sign of 
CV and EV. The formulations above are the same as in Boadway and Bruce (1984), Varian (1984), and Comes 
(1992) where CV and EV are positive when utility levels rise, UThigher than rfJ in (1) and (2). It appears that the 
signs of CV and EV indicate the direction of welfare change. Equivalently, CV and EV are positive when prices 
fall, pT lower thanpo in (4) and (5). This is because the expenditure function C(p, U) is non-decreasing in utility, 
given the same prices, and also non-decreasing in prices, given the same utility. 
Other authors, e.g., Deaton and Muellbauer (1980b) and Hausman (1981), defme CV and EV with the opposite 
sign while they follow the same utility referencing. In this case, the signs of CV and EV indicate the direction of 
compensation. For example, CV and EV are negative if prices fall. Hence, the negative sign indicates that CV ­
or EV is the amount of income that could be taken away from the consumer so that he remains at rfJ or UT• If 
prices rise, CV are EV are positive so that each measures the amount of income that should be given to the 
consumer to keep him at rfJ or UT• While CV and EV are always of the same sign. they need not be equal in value. 
6 
for UT (Koniis, 1939; Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980b). These bounds can be established by 
invoking duality and expenditure minimization.3 
From (4), (5), and (6), welfare changes and cost of living indices are measured by 
computing the compensated incomes C(pT, UO) and C(p°, l.f) starting, respectively, from the 
observed incomes C(p°, UO) and C(pT, UT). While compensated incomes are unobservable in 
theory, they are derivable from ordinary demand functions estimated in practice from price and 
income data. For this reason, an algorithm for deriving compensated incomes from ordinary 
demand functions is valuable for rigorous analysis of the effects of price changes on welfare 
levels and on the costs of maintaining a standard of living. 
3. The RESORT Algorithm 
Let CJ = C(p°, lP) and cr = C(pT, rfJ). Also, let t be an auxiliary variable in the interval 
o< t < T such that p(t) is a differentiable price curve connecting pO to pT. By continuity in 
prices of the expenditure function, the change from CJ to CT can be expressed as 
3Let tf be the quantity bundle bought at pO and qT be the bundle bought at pT. Define the costs by the dot 
products pO'qO, pT.qT, pO'qT, and pT·tf. The Laspeyres price index (1/) and Paasche price index (1/) are 
I L = pT.qO I P = pT.qT 
p pO'qO P pO'q T 
By duality, C(p°, l!') = p0-tf and C(pT, lJT) = pT.qT. Expenditure minimization implies that C(p°, lJT) :s; p0-qT 
and C(pT, l!') :s; pT·tf. It follows that 
C(pT Uo) L pT.qO C(pT U T) P pT.qT1(p°,pT;UO) = ' :s: I = -­ 1(p°,pT;U T) = ' ~ Ip = -­ . C(p0,Uo) p pO'qO C(p0,UT) pO'qT 
-Alternatively, given that the expenditure function is concave in prices" these inequalities can be established from 
the fact that the Laspeyres and Paasche price indices are first-order Taylor series approximations to their ,­
corresponding true cost of living indices. 
7 
(7) 
where Hj(p(t) , l.P) is a compensated demand function by Shephard's lemma. 
The analysis will focus on computing (7) where cr = C(pT, lP) is being measured starting 
from CJ = C(p°, lP) as prices change from and pO to pT. In principle, the procedure applies 
equally to measuring C(p°, [f) from C(pT, [f) as prices change back from pT to pO. For this 
reason, the discussion in the rest of the paper will consider only the computation of (7) to avoid 
unnecessary repetition. 
Following Vartia, let the total change in each price frompo = {pjO} to pT = {pn be broken 
into price steps. Hence, suppose that there are steps 
(8) S = 0, ..., Z I::;;Z<oo 
where Z is a positive integer. Thus, the price at each step is 
° (9) pj(s+ 1) = Pj(s) + Z1 (PjT - Pj ) Pj(O) = Pj ° 
Starting from the original prices, pjo, the prices at the last step s = Z are the same as the 
tenninal prices, pr 
Let q be an auxiliary variable in the interval s ~ q ~ s+ 1. Hence, given (9), the 
analogous equation to (7) is 
n 
(10) C(s+ 1) = C(s) + L f.S+l Hj(P(q), Uo) dpj(q) . 
j=1 S 
In (10), the starting value of compensated income is CJ. The tenninal value is obtained by 
adding to CJ the sum of the changes in compensated income from each step. That is, 
8 
-
Z 
(11) C T = CO + L (C(s+l) - C(s» C(O) = CO . 
s=O 
Therefore, the solution for (! is the value of C(s) at the last step Z, i.e., 
(12) C(Z) = CT. 
To calculate (10), consider fIrst the fact that it can be expressed as a Taylor series expansion 
around the starting value C(s). That is, for an rth-order Taylor series expansion with a 
remainder R, 
(13)	 C(s+ 1) = C(s) + Lr -1 dmC(P(q), UO) + R
 
m=l m!
 
where crC(p(q) , rfJ) is the total differential of order m of the expenditure function as the prices 
p(q) change fromp(s) to p(s+ 1). Given a non-zero remainder, the approximation could achieve 
arbitrary accuracy depending on the choice of the highest order r of the Taylor series in (13). 
Consider approximations up to the second-order. By duality, 
where hi(P(s),C(s» is the ordinary demand function. That is, when compensated income is 
substituted into the ordinary demand functions, the quantities obtained are the compensated 
quantities. Moreover, using general notation, the Slutsky equation yields, 
-
(15) 
where Sij denotes the compensated (Hicksian) price effect. 
Recalling (9), the changes in prices from one step to the next are given by, 
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1 T 0(16) /}.P j = Pj(s+ 1) - Pj(s) = - (Pj - Pj) . 
z 
Substituting (14) to (16) into (13) and ignoring the remainder term R, the second-order Taylor 
series approximation C,(s+ 1) to the true compensated income C(s+ 1) is, 
(17) 
The computation of (17) starting at s = 0 begins with the given compensated income C,(O) = 
C(O) = CJ at the initial price vector p(O) = pO. At any step s+1, the computation requires that 
the ordinary demand functions and its derivatives be evaluated given the known prices and the 
compensated income from the preceding step s. In this view, (17) is a "forward" second-order 
approximation. 
Suppose that (17) has been computed all the way to the last step s = Z, where C,(Z) is the 
approximation to the true compensated income cr at the terminal price vector p(Z) = pT. 
Technically, the "forward" approximation may be reversed starting with C,(Z) and p(Z). That 
is, C,(s) is to be solved knowing C,(s+ 1) as prices change from p(s+ 1) to p(s). Hence, using 
(16), the reverse of (17) or the "backward" second-order approximation to C(s) is, 
n 1 n n 
(18) C,(s) =C,(s+ 1) - L hj(P(s+1),C,(s+1» /}.P j + - L L Sij (P(s+ 1),C,(s+ 1» /}.pj/}.pj • 
j=1 2 j=1 j=1 
The "solution" to C,(s) in (18) will not necessarily be the same as its "known" value in (17). 
Similarly, the "solution" to C,(s+ 1) in (17) will not necessarily be the same as its "known" 
value in (18).4 To insure that (17) and (18) give the same values of C,(s) and C,(s+ 1), combine 
-

4While the analytic basis may not be obvious, this claim may be verified numerically.
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the two equations and solve Cr(s+ 1) as the mutual unknown from, 
(19) 
starting from Cr(O) = C(O) = CJ. Because Cr(s+ 1) is in both sides of (19), the solution 
requires iteration. In (19), the values of Cr(s) and Cr(s+ 1) must satisfy both the "forward" 
solution in (17) and the "backward" solution in (18). Thus, (19) is a REversible Second-ORder 
Taylor (RESORT) algorithm for computing compensated income. 
The RESORT approximation to the true compensated income cr in (7) is given by the 
solution of (19) at the last step S = Z, Le., 
(20) 
Obviously, the iterative solution of (19) can only begin forward from the initial compensated 
income C(O) = CJ at prices Pi(O) = Pia' However, once the terminal solution Cr(Z) at prices 
Pi(Z) = pt is obtained, reversibility means that RESORT can reproduce exactly each 
intermediate compensated income approximation Cr(s) at prices Pi(S), 0 ~ S ~ Z, starting 
backwards from Cr(Z). Thus, by solving simultaneously the ordinary second-order Taylor 
approximations in (17) and (18), the RESORT algorithm in (19) has the ideal feature of giving 
a unique value of compensated income for each price vector, which is not necessarily true when 
(17) and (18) are solved separately. ­
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Numerical simulations using the same examples in section 5 show that (17) and RESORT 
in (19) give equally close approximations, up to four decimal places, to the true compensated 
income at each price step. Note that both (17) and (19) are step-by-step approximations from 
price step 0 to 1, 1 to 2 or, in general, from s to s+l, s = 0, 1, ... , Z. However, (17) does 
not have the reversibility feature of RESORT and, thus, (17) does not guarantee a unique 
backward and forward solution of compensated income at each price step. 
The usual second-order Taylor approximation calculates (17) but always starting from the 
original prices, i.e., a one-step procedure starting from 0 to 1, 0 to 2, or from 0 to ariy price 
step. In this case, numerical simulations also show that (17) or RESORT in (19) implemented 
step-by-step give closer approximations to the true compensated income than (17) implemented 
in one step. Therefore, to obtain precise and unique approximations to compensated income, 
RESORT is the preferred second-order Taylor series procedure to compete with Vartia's 
numerical integration. Other than mere precision, however, RESORT has other advantages over 
Vartia's procedure as discussed below. 
The expenditure function is concave and linearly homogeneous in prices. By rewriting the 
second-order terms in (19), concavity implies that (Samuelson, 1947; Sydsaeter, 1981), 
-

!:1PISll SI2 ... Sin 
n n !:1P2S21 S22 S2n ~ 0 .(21) :E:E Sij !:1p; !:1Pj = [!:1PI !:1P2 ... !:1pn] 
;=1 j=1 
!:1PnSnl Sn2 Snn 
Linear homogeneity in prices of the expenditure function implies 
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Sll SI2 ... SIn PI 0 
(22) S2I S22 
... S2n P2 
::: 
0 
Snl Sn2 ... Snn Pn 0 
In particular. (22) states that compensated demand functions are zero-degree homogeneous in 
prices.S In (21) or (22), the square matrix of compensated price effects, Sij' is symmetric by 
Young's theorem because it is the Hessian of the expenditure function. This matrix is negative 
semi-definite because of concavity, which is equivalent to saying that it has non-positive 
eigenvalues. Moreover, linear homogeneity implies that it is singular, which is equivalent to 
saying that at least one eigenvalue is zero. Therefore, the presence of a positive eigenvalue is 
sufficient evidence of a violation of concavity in prices and the absence of a zero eigenvalue is 
sufficient evidence of a violation of linear homogeneity in prices. 
In practical applications when only the ordinary demand functions are known, the RESORT 
algorithm computes Sij through the Slustky equation in (15). This equation can be rewritten in 
terms of expenditure shares and ordinary price and expenditure or income elasticities, 
(23) 
where hi = hi(p, C) is the ordinary demand function. The property in (22) means zero-degree 
homogeneity in prices of the compensated demand function, which in tum is equivalent to zero-
degree homogeneity in prices and expenditure of the ordinary demand function. It follows from 
(22) that (23) yields, 
-
,. 
SThe result in (22) follows from Euler's theorem on homogeneous functions because a compensated demand 
function is, by Shephard's lemma, the own-price derivative of the expenditure function. 
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(24) 
which is true because, 
n
LWj = 1 . 
j=l 
(25) 
This is the property of ordinary demand functions that the sum of price and income elasticities 
equals zero. Moreover, the sum of expenditure shares equals one from the budget constraint. 
Checking that both (21) and (22) are satisfied at every price set Pi(S) , from the initial set PiD 
to the tenninal set pt, is important because if either one is violated then the change in 
compensated income from one price step to the next could not have been a move from an 
expenditure-minimizing or utility-maximizing point. This feature is important in empirical work 
when it cannot be presumed that the demand system being used is globally well-behaved, or 
locally well-behaved over the price range under examination. 
In a two-good case where each good satisfies (24) or (25) and where the compensated cross-
price effects are symmetric, a necessary and sufficient condition for (21) is that the compensated 
own-price effect for either good is non-positive. This implies the condition from (23) that, 
Wi C [ ahi Pi ahi C ](26) S.. = -- -- - + - - w. :s: 0 i = 1,2 . 
II Ip2 ap. h. ac h 
i I I I 
This condition is easily visualized in the two-good case. 6 
6Suppose that the utility function is strictly quasi-concave so that the indifference curves are strictly convex with 
respect to the origin. In this case, an interior or tangency point with a bUdget line is utility-maximizing 
(expenditure-minimizing). At a tangency point, Sij > 0 because the two goods can only be Hicksian substitutes. 
-

This implies from (24) that Sjj < O. If the utility function is not quasi-concave, Le., indifference curves are not 
convex with respect to the origin, the utility-maximizing (expenditure-minimizing) solution is at a comer point, at 
the intercept of the budget line in one of the axes. At the comer, Sij = 0 so that (24) implies Sjj = O. Thus, given 
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In section 4, all the ordinary demand functions satisfy symmetry of compensated price 
effects and zero-degree homogeneity in prices and expenditure. However, concavity in prices 
of the expenditure function is not always satisfied. Thus, (26) will be used by RESORT to test 
for violation of concavity at every price step in the case of two goods. 
4. Vartia's Approximation by Numerical Integration 
Vartia originally proposed a step-by-step approximation by his construction of the price steps 
in (9). In this framework, he derived an expression similar to (10) by equating the total 
differential of an indirect utility function to zero, Le., holding utility constant. However, in 
place of the compensated demand function in the right-hand side of (10) Vartia had the ordinary 
demand function. This is warranted because the compensated quantity of the good is obtained 
when compensated income is substituted into the ordinary demand function. That is, 
since C(q) is compensated income that maintains utility at lfJ. In view of (27), Vartia's 
algorithm to compute (10) is based on the following approximation by numerical integration of 
an ordinary demand function, 
(28) 
only two goods, Sii ~ 0 in (26) is necessary and sufficient for a negative semi-defInite matrix of compensated price 
effects (expenditure minimization). 
Incidentally, this two-good case illustrates that concavity in prices (negative semi-defInite matrix above) of the 
expenditure function does not imply quasi-concavity of the utility function (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980b; Comes, ­
1992). Expenditure minimization is possible at the comer when the utility function is not quasi-concave. Quasi­
'" concavity of the utility function, however, implies expenditure minimization and, therefore, concavity in prices of 
the expenditure function. 
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Combining (10), (27), and (28) and replacing C(s+ 1) by the approximation value Cis + 1), 
(29) 
is Vartia's algorithm. This is implemented by following the same price steps in (9) and starting 
with the initial value of compensated income. At each step, 
(30) 
From (29) and (30), Vartia's approximation to the true compensated income CT at the last step 
Z is Cv(Z). Except for differences in notation, (29) is an exact representation of Vartia' s 
algorithm because it can reproduce all the results in his numerical illustrations. 
Like RESORT in (19), Vartia's algorithm in (29) is also reversible. Having obtained CiZ) 
and using this as a starting value, (29) can reproduce Cis) exactly at each step 0 :::; s :::; Z. In 
contrast to RESORT, however, Vartia's procedure does not require knowledge about the matrix 
of compensated price effects. Thus, while RESORT could catch demand systems that violate 
the theoretical restrictions, Vartia's procedure would let them slip undetected. 
5. Numerical Examples 
Example 1: McKenzie-Pearce Utility Function 
This example reproduces exactly the compensated incomes computed in the original 
application of Vartia's algorithm. These were obtained from the ordinary demand functions 
-

derived from the indirect utility function U(p, C) of McKenzie and Pearce (1976) given by 
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C(31) U(P,C) C(p, U) = 
where C(p, U) is the dual expenditure function. The goods are Xl and x2 with prices PI and P2' 
By Roy's identity, (31) yields the ordinary demand functions, 
(32)
 
which were also derived by Vartia, although these were reported incorrectly elsewhere in his 
paper. 7 The data are as follows: 
(33) {P~,p~} = {1,2} {Pt,P2! = {1.2375, 1.2692} UO = V(p°,C~ = 330 ; 
(34) {h~, h~} = {146.6667, 36.6667}
 
In Vartia's Table III in his appendix, there are only eight price steps or Z = 8. However, 
with only 8 steps, the illustration is not too illuminating because the difference between the 
initial and terminal levels of compensated income turned out to be very small. Hence, this paper 
modified Vartia's terminal price vector by increasing the price of good 1 further to 1.2375 and 
decreasing the price of good 2 further to 1.2692. However, the changes in the prices from one 
step to the next are the same as in Vartia's original example. The result is that the number of 
price steps is now up to Z = 19. Therefore, using (9), the prices are obtained from, 
1 T 0(35) PI(S+ 1) = P1(s) + z (PI - PI) = P1(S) + 0.0125 ; 
-
(36) 
'These ordinary demand functions are correct and are the same as those reported by Vartia in his Appendix 3, 
page 95. Unfortunately, by typographical error, Vartia incorrectly reported these demand functions as 
(P/p/)/(CI(P/+P2) for h/ and (P/P2)/(CI(pj+P2) for h2 on page 96. 
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By substituting the prices from (35) and (36) and the demand functions in (32) into Vartia's 
algorithm in (29), Cis) can be solved for each price pair, {Pis),pis)}, at each step starting from 
the original value CiO) = CJ. The values reported by Vartia in his Table III are the same as 
the values reported in Table 1 below at each step starting from the initial situation up to step 8. 
It can be verified that the ordinary demand functions in (32) are homogeneous of degree zero 
in prices and income. Also, the expenditure function C(p, U) in (31) is linearly homogeneous 
in prices and the compensated price effects are symmetric. With only two goods, a non-positive 
compensated own-price effect for one of the goods is necessary and sufficient for the concavity 
in prices of the expenditure function. This condition is satisfied for the range of prices in Table 
1, as shown by the negative compensated own-price effect for good 1.8 
Table 1 shows the true compensated income at each price step obtained from the expenditure 
function in (31). Vartia's computations of compensated income are closer to the true 
compensated income than the computations from RESORT. However, Table 1 shows that the 
results are almost always the same up to two decimal places. In any case, the issue of precision 
appears to be an empirical matter, depending on specific cases. This is illustrated by the AIDS 
model in Table 2 where RESORT gives closer approximations to the true compensated income 
at each price step than Vartia's algorithm. 
8Compensated price effects are the second-order price derivatives of the expenditure function. If the expenditure ­
function is unknown, compensated price effects could be obtained by deriving the price and income elasticities from 
the ordinary demand functions and then substituting these elasticities, together with the expenditure shares, into the 
Slutsky equations in (23) and (26) for cross-price and own-price effects, respectively. 
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Table 1 
Compensated Income From the McKenzie-Pearce Utility Function 
Price 
Steps 
Price 
of 
Good 1 
Price 
of 
Good 2 
Compensated Income 
Compensated 
Own-Price 
Effect of 
Good 1 
True 
Value 
Vartia's 
Approxi~ation 
RESORT 
Approximation 
0 1.0000 2.0000 220.0000 220.0000 220.0000 - 97.7778 
1 1.0125 1.9615 220.3734 220.3732 220.3738 - 96.5379 
2 1.0250 1.9231 220.6457 220.6453 220.6466 - 95.2622 
3 1.0375 1.8846 220.8143 220.8136 220.8156 - 93.9501 
4 1.0500 1.8461 220.8763 220.8754 220.8782 - 92.6008 
5 1.0625 1.8077 220.8289 220.8278 220.8313 -91.2137 
6 1.0750 1.7692 220.6691 220.6677 220.6719 - 89.7880 
7 1.0875 1.7308 220.3937 220.3920 220.3971 - 88.3232 
8 1.1000 1.6923 219.9996 219.9976 220.0035 - 86.8185 
9 1.1125 1.6538 219.4834 219.4811 219.4879 - 85.2735 
10 1.1250 1.6154 218.8416 218.8390 218.8467 - 83.6875 
11 1.1375 1.5769 218.0706 218.0677 218.0763 - 82.0600 
12 1.1500 1.5384 217.1667 217.1635 217.1730 - 80.3905 
13 1.1625 1.5000 216.1260 216.1225 216.1329 - 78.6786 
14 1.1750 1.4615 214.9444 214.9406 214.9520 - 76.9238 
15 1.1875 1.4231 213.6178 213.6137 213.6261 - 75.1259 
16 1.2000 1.3846 212.1418 212.1373 212.1507 - 73.2846 
17 1.2125 1.3461 210.5117 210.5069 210.5215 - 71.3997 
18 1.2250 1.3077 208.7230 208.7178 208.7335 - 69.4713 
19 1.2375 1.2692 206.7707 206.7651 206.7819 - 67.4993 
-
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As noted before, numerical simulations show that RESORT in (19) gives equally close 
approximations to the true compensated income as the second-order approximation in (17) 
implemented as step-by-step procedure like (19), from 0 to 1, 1 to 2, ... , 17 to 18 and 18 to 19. 
However, RESORT gives much closer approximations compared to (17) implemented as a one-
step procedure, Le., always starting (17) from 0 to any price step. For these reasons, only the 
results from RESORT are reported in the tables. 
Example 2: A Well-behaved Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) 
Consider the indirect utility function, 
1 
(37) U(p, C) = (~)"8 
where P is the price vector and C is income. A and B are price functions defined by 
(38) 
(39) lnB ~o + L 
n 
~i lnPi . 
i=l 
Combining (37), (38), and (39) and then using Roy's identity, the indirect utility function yields
 
the ordinary demand function hj(P, C) for good i,
 
. (40) h,(p,C) = ~[ a j+ troJnP; + ~jJn(~)].
 
By definition, an expenditure share is, 
-
" 
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(41) 
Thus, (40) and (41) yield, 
(42) w, = a., + t YijlnPj + p,In(~l 
which is the expenditure share function of the AIDS model (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980a, 
1980b). The AIDS parameter restrictions are, 
n n /I /I 
(43) L (Xi = 1 ; L Pi = 0 LYij = 0 LYij = 0i=1 i=1 i=1 j=1 
These restrictions insure additivity of shares to one; zero-degree homogeneity in income and 
prices of the ordinary demand functions; and symmetry of the compensated price effects. 
Consider the case of two goods. The AIDS ordinary demand function in (40) yields the 
elasticities, 
ah. p.(44) E.. = -'--! = - 1 + ~, {YU - p,[w, - p,In(~l]}; 
/I alP., h., 
ah. p. 
(45) E.. = _'...l. 
= ~.{Yij - Pi[Wj - Pjln(~)]};
') alP. ) h., , 
ah i C p.(46) E =-- = 1 + -' • 
iC ac h., Wi 
By substituting (44) and (46) into (26), the compensated own-price effect for either good is 
2(47) S.. = - ~[(1 -w.)w. - y .. - p,.ln(C)].
/I 2 ,,1/ A 
Pi 
-
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In Table 2, the following parameter values are used, 
(48) ao = 0 ; ~o = 0 ; a l = - 0.45 ; ~l = 0.10 ; y 11 = - 0.20 . 
The values of the other parameters, CX2' {32' 1'12' 1'21' and 1'22' are obtained from (48) subject to 
the parameter restrictions in (43). The price data for the initial and terminal situations, as well 
as the price steps, are the same as in example 1. However, to yield the same initial income, the 
fixed level of utility is set equal to 100. That is, 
(49) {P~,p~} = {1,2} ; {plT,pn = {1.2375,1.2692} ; CO = 220 ; UO = 100 . 
The true compensated income in this AIDS model can be obtained by solving for C(P, U) 
from (37) and using the parameters in (48) and (49). The compensated income approximations 
at each price step using RESORT in (19) and Vartia's algorithm in (29) are shown in Table 2. 
Moreover, notice that the above two-good AIDS model is well-behaved in the price range under 
examination from the fact that the compensated own-price effect for good 1 is negative. 
In Table 2, the RESORT approximation to the true compensated income is closer than 
Vartia's approximation at each price step. Thus, given Vartia's closer approximations in Table 
1, the relative precision of one procedure over the other is case specific. Therefore, these 
results show that Vartia's algorithm or RESORT is not necessarily superior over the other 
simply in terms of the closeness of the approximations to the true compensated income. 
-
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Table 2 
Compensated Income From a Well-behaved AIDS Model 
Price 
Steps 
Price 
of 
Good 1 
Price 
of 
Good 2 
Compensated Income 
Compensated 
Own-Price 
Effect of 
Good 1 
True 
Value 
Vartia's 
Approximation 
RESORT 
Approximation 
0 1.0000 2.0000 220.0000 220.0000 220.0000 - 61.7870 
1 1.0125 1.9615 216.7793 216.7604 216.7792 - 58.6254 
2 1.0250 1.9231 213.4973 213.4787 213.4970 - 55.5901 
3 1.0375 1.8846 210.1547 210.1364 210.1543 - 52.6759 
4 1.0500 1.8461 206.7524 206.7344 206.7519 - 49.8776 
5 1.0625 1.8077 203.2912 203.2735 203.2905 - 47.1902 
6 1.0750 1.7692 199.7718 199.7544 199.7710 - 44.6094 
7 1.0875 1.7308 196.1949 196.1779 196.1941 - 42.1306 
8 1.1000 1.6923 192.5615 192.5447 192.5605 - 39.7499 
9 1.1125 1.6538 188.8721 188.8557 188.8710 - 37.4634 
10 1.1250 1.6154 185.1276 185.1115 185.1264 - 35.2674 
11 1.1375 1.5769 181.3287 181.3129 181.3274 - 33.1585 
12 1.1500 1.5384 177.4760 177.4606 177.4746 - 31.1335 
13 1.1625 1.5000 173.5704 173.5553 173.5689 - 29.1893 
14 1.1750 1.4615 169.6125 169.5978 169.6109 - 27.3230 
15 1.1875 1.4231 165.6031 165.5887 165.6014 - 25.5318 
16 1.2000 1.3846 161.5429 161.5289 161.5411 - 23.8132 
17 1.2125 1.3461 157.4327 157.4191 157.4308 - 22.1648 
18 1.2250 1.3077 153.2732 153.2600 153.2713 - 20.5842 
19 1.2375 1.2692 149.0653 149.0524 149.0633 - 19.0692 
-
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Example 3: A Mis-behaved AIDS Model 
The next example is designed to misbehave in order to show that Vartia's procedure could 
yield compensated incomes that unknowingly are theoretically invalid. Keeping everything else 
the same as in example 2, let the parameters in (48) be changed to, 
(50) «0 = 0 ; ~o = 0 ; «1 = - 0.8882 ; ~ 1 = 0.30 ; y 11 = - 0.25 . 
The values of (12' {32' 1'12' 1'21' and 1'22 are in this case derived from (50) subject to the parameter 
restrictions in (43). In this case, the two-good AIDS model is misbehaved from the fact that the 
compensated own-price effect for good 1 turns from negative to positive as shown in Table 3. 
It is interesting to note in Table 3 that the RESORT approximations to the true compensated 
income are closer than Vartia's approximations for the range of prices with negative 
compensated own-price effects. In this range, the compensated incomes are theoretically valid. 
However, Vartia's approximations are closer for the range of prices with positive compensated 
own-price effects when compensated incomes are theoretically invalid. This case illustrates the 
advantage of RESORT over Vartia's algorithm in catching violations of the theoretical 
restrictions that would have been undetected by Vartia's procedure. 
The next example utilizes ordinary demand functions from a model without an explicit utility 
function. This is precisely the situation for which Vartia's algorithm and RESORT are intended 
because the values of the true compensated income are not exactly known and can only be 
approximated from the ordinary demand functions. 
-
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Table 3 
Compensated Income From a Mis-behaved AIDS Model 
Price 
Steps 
Price 
of 
Good 1 
Price 
of 
Good 2 
Compensated Income 
Compensated 
Own-Price 
Effect of 
Good 1 
True 
Value 
Vartia's 
Approximation 
RESORT 
Approximation 
0 1.0000 2.0000 220.0000 220.0000 220.0000 - 12.7086 
1 1.0125 1.9615 220.4166 220.4143 220.4164 - 11.1791 
2 1.0250 1.9231 220.8215 220.8193 220.8212 - 9.6764 
3 1.0375 1.8846 221.2159 221.2138 221.2154 -8.1974 
4 1.0500 1.8461 221.6010 221.5990 221.6002 - 6.7393 
5 1.0625 1.8077 221.9782 221.9762 221.9772 - 5.2990 
6 1.0750 1.7692 222.3488 222.3470 222.3475 - 3.8734 
7 1.0875 1.7308 222.7145 222.7128 222.7128 - 2.4596 
8 1.1000 1.6923 223.0768 223.0752 223.0749 - 1.0544 
9 1.1125 1.6538 223.4377 223.4363 223.4354 0.3453 
10 1.1250 1.6154 223.7992 223.7979 223.7964 1.7430 
11 1.1375 1.5769 224.1633 224.1622 224.1601 3.1420 
12 1.1500 1.5384 224.5325 224.5316 224.5289 4.5460 
13 1.1625 1.5000 224.9095 224.9089 224.9054 5.9588 
14 1.1750 1.4615 225.2972 225.2968 225.2924 7.3846 
15 1.1875 1.4231 225.6989 225.6987 225.6934 8.8278 
16 
17 
1.2000 
1.2125 
1.3846 
1.3461 
226.1181 
226.5590 
226.1183 
226.5596 
226.1119 
226.5519 
10.2932 
11.7860 
18 
19 
1.2250 
1.2375 
1.3077 
1.2692 
227.0261 
227.5247 
227.0272 
227.5263 
227.0181 
227.5156 
13.3120 
14.8776 
-
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Example 4: A Generalized Logit Demand System 
Approximations to compensated income are, in principle, unnecessary in the preceding three 
examples because the true compensated incomes are known from the utility function or 
expenditure function. These three examples are, however, useful for gauging the relative 
accuracy of the compensated income approximations from Vartia's algorithm and RESORT by 
comparing their results to the true values of compensated income. This comparison is not 
possible if the ordinary demand functions did not have an explicit utility function. 
Requiring that demand functions have an explicit utility function is, however, very limiting 
in practice. More importantly, this requirement is unnecessary in principle. For consistency 
with theory, it is necessary and sufficient that the demand system have a symmetric and negative 
semi-definite matrix of compensated price effects. If so, the demand system is "integrable," 
i.e., a utility function exists that could rationalize the demand system, although the utility 
function may not be recoverable. For this type of demand system, Vartia's algorithm and 
RESORT are essential for approximating the unknown true compensated income. 
An example of an integrable demand system that has been successfully estimated in practice 
is the generalized logit demand model (Dumagan and Mount, 1993 and 1995). No utility 
function is posited. However, the properties implied by utility maximization or expenditure 
minimization are embodied into the specification, as described below. 
Since expenditure shares must sum to unity, let Wi follow a generalized logit specification, 
n/i /i(51) Wi = LWi = 1 n i=l/1 + .. , + el • fiLe
i=l 
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"'~' ' 
From (41) and (51), the ordinary demand function hi(p, C) is 
C e~ (52)	 hi(p, C) == - -n-­
Pi Le~
 
i=l 
The demand system comprising hi(p, C) for all n goods can be made well-behaved, i.e., satisfy 
zero-degree homogeneity in P and C as well as symmetry and negative semi-definiteness of the 
matrix of compensated price effects, by embodying these properties in the function/;. 
The variants of the generalized logit implemented so far differ in their specifications of /;. 
The following specification was implemented by Rothman, Hong, and Mount (1994), 
(53) i *" k 
where n, {3, and 0 are parameters. SPI is a Stone price index, 
(54) lnSPI == L 
n 
Wi lnPi . 
i=l 
The cross-price "weights" (}ik are defined by 
(55) 
where 'Y is a parameter. These weights are built into the model, together with the symmetry 
restriction (Oile = Old)' to ensure the symmetry of the compensated price effects. 
To facilitate deriving the demand elasticities of the generalized logit model, note from the 
share definition in (41) that the ordinary price and income elasticities can be written in terms of 
the share elasticities as follows: 
-
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ahi Pi awi	 Pj(56)	 Ejj =-- = ---- - 1
 
api hi api Wi
 
ah j Pk awi Pk(57) = -- = ---- i :f. k ; Eile 
apk hi apk Wi
 
ahi e awi e
(58) = -- = ---- + 1 .EiC 
ae hi ae	 Wi 
Let X be a vector of variables determining Ii, i.e., Ii =1i(X> and let x be a specific element of 
X. Thus, x could be price (Pi or pJ or income (C). Therefore, from (51), the elasticity of Wi 
with respect to x is, 
(59) 'V j . 
Combining (51) to (55) and then using (56) to (59), the ordinary demand elasticities of the above 
generalized logit model with n goods are, 9 
9In (54) and (55), the expenditure shares are taken as "fixed" when the elasticities are derived. This means, 
in effect, that the price and income elasticities in (60), (61), and (62), as well as the compensated price effects in 
(64) and (65), are for the "short-run" when expenditure shares may be taken as "fixed." It should be noted, 
however, that in calculating the results in Table 4 the expenditure shares are allowed to change from one price step 
to the next. This should be obvious from the iterative solution of the RESORT algorithm in (19) and of Vartia's 
algorithm in (29). Each algorithm yields a compensated income solution at each price step and, therefore, yields 
the compensated quantities by substitution of this solution into the ordinary demand functions. Therefore, at each 
price step, there is a unique set of expenditure shares. The unique set of expenditure shares solved by RESORT 
at each price step is used to calculate the compensated price effects from the ordinary price and income elasticities. 
This procedure is used to calculate, for example, the generalized logit compensated own-price effects for good 1 
reported in Table 4, based on equation (66). 
28 
(62) EiC = Pi - L 
n 
wj Pj + 1 
j:l 
It can be verified that 
(63) E ji + L
n 
E ik + EiC = 0 i "" k 
k:l 
which imply that the ordinary demand functions in this generalized logit model satisfy zero-
degree homogeneity in prices and income. Substituting the elasticities in (60) to (62) into the 
Slutsky equation in (23), it can be verified that 
w.C . 
(64) Sik = Pi1pk (fJ jk 6ik + Wk) 
That is, the generalized logit satisfies the symmetry of the compensated cross-price effects given 
the symmetry of the price parameters in (53) and of the cross-price weights in (55). Moreover, 
the price and income elasticities and the Slutsky equation yields the compensated own-price 
effect, 
Consider now the case with only two goods. Given that the generalized logit satisfies zero-
degree homogeneity in (63) and symmetry in (64), the two-good model is well-behaved if and 
only if (65) is non-positive for any of the two goods, i.e., for good 1, 
wlC (66) Su = - -2-(fJ I2 612 + 1 - wd:s: o. 
PI 
Notice from (51) that the generalized logit guarantees that each expenditure share lies strictly 
between 0 and 1. Hence, the cross-price weight (OiJ is positive. Therefore, since income or 
-
29
 
expenditure and prices are positive, the sign of (66) depends only on the sign of 012' 
Given a positive 012' (66) is strictly negative for all prices so that the generalized logit is 
"integrable," implying that an underlying utility function exists in principle, although it is 
unknown. Therefore, an unknown underlying expenditure function also exists. Thus, except 
for the initial income CJ that by duality is compensated income, the generalized logit demand 
model has an unknown true compensated income. In this case, the relative precision between 
the approximations from Vartia's method and RESORT cannot be assessed because there is no 
true compensated income as a basis for comparison. 
For the results in Table 4, the parameters of the generalized logit model are chosen such that 
the initial income is the same as before. These parameters are, 
(67)	 a1 = 0 ; PI = 0.5 ; a2 = 0 ; P2 = 0
 
f> 12 = 1.5 ; y = 2.0 ; CO = 220 .
 
The two approximations to compensated income are very close to each other at each price 
step. However, because the true compensated income is unknown, there is no basis to say that 
one approximation is more precise than the other. 
Finally, note that this two-good generalized logit model is well-behaved from the fact that 
the compensated own-price effect for good 1 is negative. Indeed, (66) and (67) imply that this 
model is "globally" well-behaved for all positive or non-zero sets of prices and expenditures. 
-
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Table 4 
Compensated Income From a Well-behaved Generalized Logit Model 
Price 
Steps 
Price 
of 
Good 1 
Price 
of 
Good 2 
Compensated Income 
Compensated 
Own-Price 
Effect of 
Good 1 
True 
Value 
Vartia's 
Approximation 
RESORT 
Approximation 
0 1.0000 2.0000 220.0000 220.0000 220.0000 - 67.2522 
1 1.0125 1.9615 Unknown 220.3899 220.3902 - 66.0149 
2 1.0250 1.9231 Unknown 220.7128 220.7135 - 61.8006 
3 1.0375 1.8846 Unknown 220.9672 220.9683 - 63.6080 
4 1.0500 1.8461 Unknown 221.1517 221.1532 - 62.4360 
5 1.0625 1.8077 Unknown 221.2647 221.2666 - 61.2834 
6 1.0750 1.7692 Unknown 221.3043 221.3067 - 60.1492 
7 1.0875 1.7308 Unknown 221.2690 221.2718 - 59.0323 
8 1.1000 1.6923 Unknown 221.1566 221.1600 - 57.9317 
9 1.1125 1.6538 Unknown 220.9652 220.9691 - 56.8463 
10 1.1250 1.6154 Unknown 220.6927 220.6972 - 55.7752 
11 1.1375 1.5769 Unknown 220.3367 220.3418 - 54.7174 
12 1.1500 1.5384 Unknown 219.8948 219.9006 - 53.6719 
13 1.1625 1.5000 Unknown 219.3644 219.3709 - 52.6378 
14 1.1750 1.4615 Unknown 218.7428 218.7500 - 51.6141 
15 1.1875 1.4231 Unknown 218.0269 218.0349 - 50.5999 
16 1.2000 1.3846 Unknown 217.2136 217.2225 - 49.5942 
17 1.2125 1.3461 Unknown 216.2996 216.3094 - 48.5961 
18 1.2250 1.3077 Unknown 215.2812 215.2920 - 47.6046 
19 1.2375 1.2692 Unknown 214.1545 214.1663 - 46.6188 
-
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6. CONCLUSION
 
Vartia's algorithm or the RESORT procedure in this paper pennits the computation of 
compensated income from ordinary demand functions without having to know the underlying 
utility function. As a result, the true measures of welfare changes and cost of living indices are 
obtainable from observed price and expenditure data. The methods provided by Vartia and 
RESORT are important for both theoretical and practical reasons. First, the choice of demand 
systems in applied work need not be restricted to families having a utility function or expenditure 
function of an explicit parametric form such as the translog (Christensen, Jorgenson, and Lau, 
1975; Christensen and Caves, 1980) and the "almost ideal demand system" or AIDS (Deaton 
and Muellbauer, 1980a and 1980b). Second, it is not necessary to recover the underlying 
expenditure function as suggested by Hausman (1981) to derive exact welfare measures in the 
case of a single price change. In any case, Hausman's method may not be practicable when 
more than one price changes at the same time. LaFrance (1986) and LaFrance and Hanemann 
(1989) found that the integrability restrictions on demand functions to obtain closed fonn 
solutions are "probably unpalatable for most applied situations," (LaFrance, 1985). Moreover, 
there are well-behaved demand systems in closed fonn for which it is impossible to recover the 
expenditure function in closed fonn (McKenzie and Ulph, 1986). Third, it offers a better 
alternative to approximations of Hicksian welfare measures based on the Marshallian consumer's 
surplus as suggested by Willig (1976) and Shonkwiler (1991). In principle, no recourse to 
consumer's surplus is necessary as a basis to measure the true Hicksian welfare change. In any 
case, consumer's surplus is of limited validity to the special cases of a single price change and 
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of multiple price changes when the goods under study have equal income elasticities or when 
all income elasticities are unitary under homothetic preferences (Chipman and Moore, 1976 and 
1980; Silberberg, 1972 and 1978; Just, Hueth and Schmitz, 1982; McKenzie, 1983). 
A "money metric" measure of the equivalent variation from ordinary demand functions has 
been derived through a Taylor series expansion of the indirect utility function (McKenzie and 
Pearce, 1976; McKenzie, 1983). This measure is made operational by a transformation such 
that the marginal utility of income is stationary with a value of unity at the original income and 
prices. This is equivalent to saying that the marginal value of utility is also stationary and 
unitary so that a unit of "utility" is exactly a unit of "money" and a change in the value of the 
indirect utility function is itself a "money metric" measure of the change in utility. However, 
a money measure of welfare change need not in principle contend with the marginal utility of 
income. Approximations to Hicksian welfare change obtained from ordinary demand functions 
through a Taylor series expansion of an expenditure function do not involve the marginal utility 
of income and have been shown to yield more precise measures of the equivalent variation than 
the money metric (Dumagan and Mount, 1991). 
Vartia demonstrated his algorithm using the demand functions derived from the original 
utility function utilized by McKenzie and Pearce to implement their money metric. Vartia 
showed that his procedure yields a more precise measure of compensated income and, hence, 
a more precise welfare measure than the money metric. Even so, this paper proposes RESORT 
as an alternative to Vartia's algorithm. The reason is not simply because this alternative may 
produce more precise approximations to compensated income but chiefly because it provides a 
-

framework to assess the validity of the results. Indeed, the vital lesson from the numerical 
33
 
illustrations in this paper is that the superiority of one approximation over the other cannot be 
based on mere precision. Either method could be more precise than the other on a case by case 
basis. For example, while Vartia's algorithm appears to be more precise than RESORT in Table 
1, RESORT is shown to be more precise than Vartia's algorithm in Table 2 and in Table 3, for 
the theoretically valid values of compensated income. While obviously very important, precision 
is, therefore, an empirical issue that cannot be an exclusive basis for choosing one approximation 
method over the other. 
However, the ability to check for the theoretical validity of the compensated income 
computations is a valuable feature of RESORT that is absent in Vartia's framework. This ability 
is a valid reason to choose RESORT over Vartia's algorithm because, in applications, ordinary 
demand functions do not always satisfy the properties implied by utility maximization or 
expenditure minimization. lO That is, it is not safe to assume that the demand functions used 
in the approximations are well-behaved over the price range under examination. RESORT has 
the built-in capability to check for the theoretical validity of the computed compensated income 
because it calculates the elements of the matrix of compensated price effects as an integral part 
of the computation of compensated income. At each price step, this matrix should be evaluated 
for symmetry and negative semi-definiteness. 
Another attractive feature of RESORT is reversibility, which is shared by Vartia's algorithm. 
If the computed tenninal value of compensated income is used as the starting income and the 
price changes are reversed from the tenninal levels to the initial levels, the computed income 
Illporter-Hudak and Hayes (1991) demonstrated the practicability ofVartia's algorithm by deriving compensated ­
incomes and cost-of-living indices from estimated ordinary demand functions, including "non-integrable" demand 
systems. The results from the latter systems are, however, invalid for violating the symmetry and negative semi­
definiteness of the matrix of compensated price effects. 
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at the initial prices will be identical to the initial level of income. In fact, the compensated 
income at each price step is the same in the forward and backward procedures. That is, 
RESORT guarantees unique values of compensated income for each set of prices and, as a 
result, also unique measures of welfare changes and cost of living indices. These unique results 
are not, however, guaranteed by the usual Taylor series expansion for computing compensated 
income. 
-
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